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For ERP LN feature pack upgrade, what method of install are you using?
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Security

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>> Advertisement <<
Can you answer the ERP quiz?
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Infocus: WiMax: Just Another Security Challenge?

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WiMax: Just Another Security Challenge?
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More rss feeds from SecurityFocus

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Categories: Security

TA18-201A: Emotet Malware

US-CERT - Alerts - July 20, 2018 - 10:24pm
Original release date: July 20, 2018
Systems Affected

Network Systems

Overview

Emotet is an advanced, modular banking Trojan that primarily functions as a downloader or dropper of other banking Trojans. Emotet continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments, and the private and public sectors.

This joint Technical Alert (TA) is the result of Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) analytic efforts, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC).

Description

Emotet continues to be among the most costly and destructive malware affecting SLTT governments. Its worm-like features result in rapidly spreading network-wide infection, which are difficult to combat. Emotet infections have cost SLTT governments up to $1 million per incident to remediate.

Emotet is an advanced, modular banking Trojan that primarily functions as a downloader or dropper of other banking Trojans. Additionally, Emotet is a polymorphic banking Trojan that can evade typical signature-based detection. It has several methods for maintaining persistence, including auto-start registry keys and services. It uses modular Dynamic Link Libraries (DLLs) to continuously evolve and update its capabilities. Furthermore, Emotet is Virtual Machine-aware and can generate false indicators if run in a virtual environment.

Emotet is disseminated through malspam (emails containing malicious attachments or links) that uses branding familiar to the recipient; it has even been spread using the MS-ISAC name. As of July 2018, the most recent campaigns imitate PayPal receipts, shipping notifications, or “past-due” invoices purportedly from MS-ISAC. Initial infection occurs when a user opens or clicks the malicious download link, PDF, or macro-enabled Microsoft Word document included in the malspam. Once downloaded, Emotet establishes persistence and attempts to propagate the local networks through incorporated spreader modules.

Figure 1: Malicious email distributing Emotet

Currently, Emotet uses five known spreader modules: NetPass.exe, WebBrowserPassView, Mail PassView, Outlook scraper, and a credential enumerator.

  1. NetPass.exe is a legitimate utility developed by NirSoft that recovers all network passwords stored on a system for the current logged-on user. This tool can also recover passwords stored in the credentials file of external drives.
  2. Outlook scraper is a tool that scrapes names and email addresses from the victim’s Outlook accounts and uses that information to send out additional phishing emails from the compromised accounts.
  3. WebBrowserPassView is a password recovery tool that captures passwords stored by Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Safari, and Opera and passes them to the credential enumerator module.
  4. Mail PassView is a password recovery tool that reveals passwords and account details for various email clients such as Microsoft Outlook, Windows Mail, Mozilla Thunderbird, Hotmail, Yahoo! Mail, and Gmail and passes them to the credential enumerator module.
  5. Credential enumerator is a self-extracting RAR file containing two components: a bypass component and a service component. The bypass component is used for the enumeration of network resources and either finds writable share drives using Server Message Block (SMB) or tries to brute force user accounts, including the administrator account. Once an available system is found, Emotet writes the service component on the system, which writes Emotet onto the disk. Emotet’s access to SMB can result in the infection of entire domains (servers and clients).
Figure 2: Emotet infection process

To maintain persistence, Emotet injects code into explorer.exe and other running processes. It can also collect sensitive information, including system name, location, and operating system version, and connects to a remote command and control server (C2), usually through a generated 16-letter domain name that ends in “.eu.” Once Emotet establishes a connection with the C2, it reports a new infection, receives configuration data, downloads and runs files, receives instructions, and uploads data to the C2 server.

Emotet artifacts are typically found in arbitrary paths located off of the AppData\Local and AppData\Roaming directories. The artifacts usually mimic the names of known executables. Persistence is typically maintained through Scheduled Tasks or via registry keys. Additionally, Emotet creates randomly-named files in the system root directories that are run as Windows services. When executed, these services attempt to propagate the malware to adjacent systems via accessible administrative shares.

Note: it is essential that privileged accounts are not used to log in to compromised systems during remediation as this may accelerate the spread of the malware.

Example Filenames and Paths:

C:\Users\<username>\AppData \Local\Microsoft\Windows\shedaudio.exe

C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Macromedia\Flash Player\macromedia\bin\flashplayer.exe

Typical Registry Keys:

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

System Root Directories:

C:\Windows\11987416.exe

C:\Windows\System32\46615275.exe

C:\Windows\System32\shedaudio.exe

C:\Windows\SysWOW64\f9jwqSbS.exe

Impact

Negative consequences of Emotet infection include

  • temporary or permanent loss of sensitive or proprietary information,
  • disruption to regular operations,
  • financial losses incurred to restore systems and files, and
  • potential harm to an organization’s reputation.
Solution

NCCIC and MS-ISAC recommend that organizations adhere to the following general best practices to limit the effect of Emotet and similar malspam:

  • Use Group Policy Object to set a Windows Firewall rule to restrict inbound SMB communication between client systems. If using an alternative host-based intrusion prevention system (HIPS), consider implementing custom modifications for the control of client-to-client SMB communication. At a minimum, create a Group Policy Object that restricts inbound SMB connections to clients originating from clients.
  • Use antivirus programs, with automatic updates of signatures and software, on clients and servers.
  • Apply appropriate patches and updates immediately (after appropriate testing).
  • Implement filters at the email gateway to filter out emails with known malspam indicators, such as known malicious subject lines, and block suspicious IP addresses at the firewall.
  • If your organization does not have a policy regarding suspicious emails, consider creating one and specifying that all suspicious emails should be reported to the security or IT department.
  • Mark external emails with a banner denoting it is from an external source. This will assist users in detecting spoofed emails.
  • Provide employees training on social engineering and phishing. Urge employees not to open suspicious emails, click links contained in such emails, or post sensitive information online, and to never provide usernames, passwords, or personal information in answer to any unsolicited request. Educate users to hover over a link with their mouse to verify the destination prior to clicking on the link.
  • Consider blocking file attachments that are commonly associated with malware, such as .dll and .exe, and attachments that cannot be scanned by antivirus software, such as .zip files.
  • Adhere to the principal of least privilege, ensuring that users have the minimum level of access required to accomplish their duties. Limit administrative credentials to designated administrators.
  • Implement Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting & Conformance (DMARC), a validation system that minimizes spam emails by detecting email spoofing using Domain Name System (DNS) records and digital signatures.

If a user or organization believes they may be infected, NCCIC and MS-ISAC recommend running an antivirus scan on the system and taking action to isolate the infected workstation based on the results. If multiple workstations are infected, the following actions are recommended:

  • Identify, shutdown, and take the infected machines off the network;
  • Consider temporarily taking the network offline to perform identification, prevent reinfections, and stop the spread of the malware;
  • Do not log in to infected systems using domain or shared local administrator accounts;
  • Reimage the infected machine(s);
  • After reviewing systems for Emotet indicators, move clean systems to a containment virtual local area network that is segregated from the infected network;
  • Issue password resets for both domain and local credentials;
  • Because Emotet scrapes additional credentials, consider password resets for other applications that may have had stored credentials on the compromised machine(s);
  • Identify the infection source (patient zero); and
  • Review the log files and the Outlook mailbox rules associated with the infected user account to ensure further compromises have not occurred. It is possible that the Outlook account may now have rules to auto-forward all emails to an external email address, which could result in a data breach.
Reporting

MS-ISAC is the focal point for cyber threat prevention, protection, response, and recovery for the nation’s SLTT governments. More information about this topic, as well as 24/7 cybersecurity assistance for SLTT governments, is available by phone at 866-787-4722, by email at SOC@cisecurity.org, or on MS-ISAC’s website at https://msisac.cisecurity.org/.

To report an intrusion and request resources for incident response or technical assistance, contact NCCIC by email at NCCICCustomerService@hq.dhs.gov or by phone at 888-282-0870.

References
Revision History
  • July, 20 2018: Initial version

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


Categories: Security

TA18-149A: HIDDEN COBRA – Joanap Backdoor Trojan and Brambul Server Message Block Worm

US-CERT - Alerts - May 29, 2018 - 1:18pm
Original release date: May 29, 2018 | Last revised: May 31, 2018
Systems Affected

Network systems

Overview

This joint Technical Alert (TA) is the result of analytic efforts between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Working with U.S. government partners, DHS and FBI identified Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and other indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with two families of malware used by the North Korean government:

  • a remote access tool (RAT), commonly known as Joanap; and
  • a Server Message Block (SMB) worm, commonly known as Brambul.

The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA. For more information on HIDDEN COBRA activity, visit https://www.us-cert.gov/hiddencobra.

FBI has high confidence that HIDDEN COBRA actors are using the IP addresses—listed in this report’s IOC files—to maintain a presence on victims’ networks and enable network exploitation. DHS and FBI are distributing these IP addresses and other IOCs to enable network defense and reduce exposure to any North Korean government malicious cyber activity.

This alert also includes suggested response actions to the IOCs provided, recommended mitigation techniques, and information on how to report incidents. If users or administrators detect activity associated with these malware families, they should immediately flag it, report it to the DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) or the FBI Cyber Watch (CyWatch), and give it the highest priority for enhanced mitigation.

See the following links for a downloadable copy of IOCs:

NCCIC conducted analysis on four malware samples and produced a Malware Analysis Report (MAR). MAR-10135536.3 – RAT/Worm examines the tactics, techniques, and procedures observed in the malware. Visit MAR-10135536.3 – HIDDEN COBRA RAT/Worm for the report and associated IOCs.

Description

According to reporting of trusted third parties, HIDDEN COBRA actors have likely been using both Joanap and Brambul malware since at least 2009 to target multiple victims globally and in the United States—including the media, aerospace, financial, and critical infrastructure sectors. Users and administrators should review the information related to Joanap and Brambul from the Operation Blockbuster Destructive Malware Report [1] in conjunction with the IP addresses listed in the .csv and .stix files provided within this alert. Like many of the families of malware used by HIDDEN COBRA actors, Joanap, Brambul, and other previously reported custom malware tools, may be found on compromised network nodes. Each malware tool has different purposes and functionalities.

Joanap malware is a fully functional RAT that is able to receive multiple commands, which can be issued by HIDDEN COBRA actors remotely from a command and control server. Joanap typically infects a system as a file dropped by other HIDDEN COBRA malware, which users unknowingly downloaded either when they visit sites compromised by HIDDEN COBRA actors, or when they open malicious email attachments.

During analysis of the infrastructure used by Joanap malware, the U.S. Government identified 87 compromised network nodes. The countries in which the infected IP addresses are registered are as follows:

  • Argentina
  • Belgium
  • Brazil
  • Cambodia
  • China
  • Colombia
  • Egypt
  • India
  • Iran
  • Jordan
  • Pakistan
  • Saudi Arabia
  • Spain
  • Sri Lanka
  • Sweden
  • Taiwan
  • Tunisia

Malware often infects servers and systems without the knowledge of system users and owners. If the malware can establish persistence, it could move laterally through a victim’s network and any connected networks to infect nodes beyond those identified in this alert.

Brambul malware is a brute-force authentication worm that spreads through SMB shares. SMBs enable shared access to files between users on a network. Brambul malware typically spreads by using a list of hard-coded login credentials to launch a brute-force password attack against an SMB protocol for access to a victim’s networks.

Technical Details

Joanap

Joanap is a two-stage malware used to establish peer-to-peer communications and to manage botnets designed to enable other operations. Joanap malware provides HIDDEN COBRA actors with the ability to exfiltrate data, drop and run secondary payloads, and initialize proxy communications on a compromised Windows device. Other notable functions include

  • file management,
  • process management,
  • creation and deletion of directories, and
  • node management.

Analysis indicates the malware encodes data using Rivest Cipher 4 encryption to protect its communication with HIDDEN COBRA actors. Once installed, the malware creates a log entry within the Windows System Directory in a file named mssscardprv.ax. HIDDEN COBRA actors use this file to capture and store victims’ information such as the host IP address, host name, and the current system time.

Brambul

Brambul malware is a malicious Windows 32-bit SMB worm that functions as a service dynamic link library file or a portable executable file often dropped and installed onto victims’ networks by dropper malware. When executed, the malware attempts to establish contact with victim systems and IP addresses on victims’ local subnets. If successful, the application attempts to gain unauthorized access via the SMB protocol (ports 139 and 445) by launching brute-force password attacks using a list of embedded passwords. Additionally, the malware generates random IP addresses for further attacks.

Analysts suspect the malware targets insecure or unsecured user accounts and spreads through poorly secured network shares. Once the malware establishes unauthorized access on the victim’s systems, it communicates information about victim’s systems to HIDDEN COBRA actors using malicious email addresses. This information includes the IP address and host name—as well as the username and password—of each victim’s system. HIDDEN COBRA actors can use this information to remotely access a compromised system via the SMB protocol.

Analysis of a newer variant of Brambul malware identified the following built-in functions for remote operations:

  • harvesting system information,
  • accepting command-line arguments,
  • generating and executing a suicide script,
  • propagating across the network using SMB,
  • brute forcing SMB login credentials, and
  • generating Simple Mail Transport Protocol email messages containing target host system information.

Detection and Response

This alert’s IOC files provide HIDDEN COBRA IOCs related to Joanap and Brambul. DHS and FBI recommend that network administrators review the information provided, identify whether any of the provided IP addresses fall within their organizations’ allocated IP address space, and—if found—take necessary measures to remove the malware.

When reviewing network perimeter logs for the IP addresses, organizations may find instances of these IP addresses attempting to connect to their systems. Upon reviewing the traffic from these IP addresses, system owners may find some traffic relates to malicious activity and some traffic relates to legitimate activity.

Impact

A successful network intrusion can have severe impacts, particularly if the compromise becomes public. Possible impacts include

  • temporary or permanent loss of sensitive or proprietary information,
  • disruption to regular operations,
  • financial losses incurred to restore systems and files, and
  • potential harm to an organization’s reputation.
Solution

Mitigation Strategies

DHS recommends that users and administrators use the following best practices as preventive measures to protect their computer networks:

  • Keep operating systems and software up-to-date with the latest patches. Most attacks target vulnerable applications and operating systems. Patching with the latest updates greatly reduces the number of exploitable entry points available to an attacker.
  • Maintain up-to-date antivirus software, and scan all software downloaded from the internet before executing.
  • Restrict users’ abilities (permissions) to install and run unwanted software applications, and apply the principle of least privilege to all systems and services. Restricting these privileges may prevent malware from running or limit its capability to spread through the network.
  • Scan for and remove suspicious email attachments. If a user opens a malicious attachment and enables macros, embedded code will execute the malware on the machine. Enterprises and organizations should consider blocking email messages from suspicious sources that contain attachments. For information on safely handling email attachments, see Using Caution with Email Attachments. Follow safe practices when browsing the web. See Good Security Habits and Safeguarding Your Data for additional details.
  • Disable Microsoft’s File and Printer Sharing service, if not required by the user’s organization. If this service is required, use strong passwords or Active Directory authentication. See Choosing and Protecting Passwords for more information on creating strong passwords.
  • Enable a personal firewall on organization workstations and configure it to deny unsolicited connection requests.

Response to Unauthorized Network Access

Contact DHS or your local FBI office immediately. To report an intrusion and request resources for incident response or technical assistance, contact DHS NCCIC (NCCICCustomerService@hq.dhs.gov or 888-282-0870), FBI through a local field office, or FBI’s Cyber Division (CyWatch@fbi.gov or 855-292-3937).

References Revision History
  • May 29, 2018: Initial version
  • May 31, 2018: Uploaded updated STIX and CSV files

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


Categories: Security

TA18-145A: Cyber Actors Target Home and Office Routers and Networked Devices Worldwide

US-CERT - Alerts - May 25, 2018 - 7:22pm
Original release date: May 25, 2018 | Last revised: June 07, 2018
Systems Affected
  • Small office/home office (SOHO) routers
  • Networked devices
  • Network-attached storage (NAS) devices
Overview

Cybersecurity researchers have identified that foreign cyber actors have compromised hundreds of thousands of home and office routers and other networked devices worldwide [1] [2] [3]. The actors used VPNFilter malware to target small office/home office (SOHO) routers. VPNFilter malware uses modular functionality to collect intelligence, exploit local area network (LAN) devices, and block actor-configurable network traffic. Specific characteristics of VPNFilter have only been observed in the BlackEnergy malware, specifically BlackEnergy versions 2 and 3.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recommend that owners of SOHO routers power cycle (reboot) SOHO routers and networked devices to temporarily disrupt the malware.

DHS and FBI encourage SOHO router owners to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to their local FBI field office or the FBI’s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch). Field office contacts can be identified at www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field. CyWatch can be contacted by phone at 855-292-3937 or by email at CyWatch@fbi.gov. Each submitted report should include as much informaiton as possible, specifically the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people, the type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact.

Description

The size and scope of this infrastructure impacted by VPNFilter malware is significant. The persistent VPNFilter malware linked to this infrastructure targets a variety of SOHO routers and network-attached storage devices. The initial exploit vector for this malware is currently unknown.

The malware uses a modular functionality on SOHO routers to collect intelligence, exploit LAN devices, and block actor-configurable network traffic. The malware can render a device inoperable, and has destructive functionality across routers, network-attached storage devices, and central processing unit (CPU) architectures running embedded Linux. The command and control mechanism implemented by the malware uses a combination of secure sockets layer (SSL) with client-side certificates for authentication and TOR protocols, complicating network traffic detection and analysis.

Impact

Negative consequences of VPNFilter malware infection include:

  • temporary or permanent loss of sensitive or proprietary information,
  • disruption to regular operations,
  • financial losses incurred to restore systems and files, and
  • potential harm to an organization’s reputation.
Solution

DHS and FBI recommend that all SOHO router owners power cycle (reboot) their devices to temporarily disrupt the malware.

Network device management interfaces—such as Telnet, SSH, Winbox, and HTTP—should be turned off for wide-area network (WAN) interfaces, and, when enabled, secured with strong passwords and encryption. Network devices should be upgraded to the latest available versions of firmware, which often contain patches for vulnerabilities.

Rebooting affected devices will cause non-persistent portions of the malware to be removed from the system. Network defenders should ensure that first-stage malware is removed from the devices, and appropriate network-level blocking is in place prior to rebooting affected devices. This will ensure that second stage malware is not downloaded again after reboot.

While the paths at each stage of the malware can vary across device platforms, processes running with the name "vpnfilter" are almost certainly instances of the second stage malware. Terminating these processes and removing associated processes and persistent files that execute the second stage malware would likely remove this malware from targeted devices.

References Revision History
  • May 25, 2018: Initial Version
  • June 7, 2018: Added link to June 6, 2018 Cisco Talos blog update on VPNFilter

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


Categories: Security

TA18-141A: Side-Channel Vulnerability Variants 3a and 4

US-CERT - Alerts - May 21, 2018 - 9:54pm
Original release date: May 21, 2018 | Last revised: May 22, 2018
Systems Affected

CPU hardware implementations

Overview

On May 21, 2018, new variants of the side-channel central processing unit (CPU) hardware vulnerabilities known as Spectre and Meltdown were publicly disclosed. These variants—known as 3A and 4—can allow an attacker to obtain access to sensitive information on affected systems.

Description

Common CPU hardware implementations are vulnerable to the side-channel attacks known as Spectre and Meltdown. Meltdown is a bug that "melts" the security boundaries normally enforced by the hardware, affecting desktops, laptops, and cloud computers. Spectre is a flaw that an attacker can exploit to force a CPU to reveal its data.

Variant 3a is a vulnerability that may allow an attacker with local access to speculatively read system parameters via side-channel analysis and obtain sensitive information.

Variant 4 is a vulnerability that exploits “speculative bypass.” When exploited, Variant 4 could allow an attacker to read older memory values in a CPU’s stack or other memory locations. While implementation is complex, this side-channel vulnerability could allow less privileged code to

  • Read arbitrary privileged data; and
  • Run older commands speculatively, resulting in cache allocations that could be used to exfiltrate data by standard side-channel methods.

Corresponding CVEs for Side-Channel Variants 1, 2, 3, 3a, and 4 are found below:

  • Variant 1: Bounds Check Bypass – CVE-2017-5753
  • Variant 2: Branch Target Injection – CVE-2017-5715
  • Variant 3: Rogue Data Cache Load – CVE-2017-5754
  • Variant 3a: Rogue System Register Read – CVE-2018-3640  
  • Variant 4: Speculative Store Bypass – CVE-2018-3639
Impact

Side-Channel Vulnerability Variants 3a and 4 may allow an attacker to obtain access to sensitive information on affected systems.

Solution Mitigation

NCCIC recommends users and administrators

  • Refer to their hardware and software vendors for patches or microcode,
  • Use a test environment to verify each patch before implementing, and
  • Ensure that performance is monitored for critical applications and services.
    • Consult with vendors and service providers to mitigate any degradation effects, if possible.
    • Consult with Cloud Service Providers to mitigate and resolve any impacts resulting from host operating system patching and mandatory rebooting, if applicable.

The following table contains links to advisories and patches published in response to the vulnerabilities. This table will be updated as information becomes available.

Link to Vendor InformationDate AddedAMDMay 21, 2018ARMMay 21, 2018IntelMay 22, 2018MicrosoftMay 21, 2018RedhatMay 21, 2018 References Revision History
  • May 21, 2018: Initial version
  • May 22, 2018: Added information and link to Intel in table

This product is provided subject to this Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.


Categories: Security

ISC/DShield Website TLS Updates, (Wed, Apr 4th)

SANS Internet Storm Center - April 4, 2018 - 3:36pm
On Thursday, we will change our TLS certificate to one issued by Letsencrypt. In the past, we used normal "commercial" certificates. Until a few months ago, we used HTTP Public Key Pinning. It appears that key pinning is no longer going to be supported by browsers, so we decided to remove this feature, which enabled us to use Letsencrypt. We removed the key pinning header a while ago, and browsers should no longer "pin" for our sites. But in case you are experiencing problems connecting to this site later this week, please let us know. You may still be able to connect to www.dshield.org if you can not connect to isc.sans.edu. 
Categories: Security

A Suspicious Use of certutil.exe, (Wed, Apr 4th)

SANS Internet Storm Center - April 4, 2018 - 6:43am
The Microsoft operating system is full of command line tools that help to perform administrative tasks. Some can be easily installed, like the SysInternal suite[1] and psexec.exe, others are builtin in Windows and available to everybody. The presence of calls to such tools can help to detect suspicious behaviours. Why reinvent the wheel, if a tool can achieve what you need? I recently upgraded my hunting rules on VirusTotal to collect samples that are (ab)using the "certutil.exe" tool. The purpose of this tool is to dump and display certification authority (CA) information, manage certificates and keys. This is a command line tool that accepts a lot of parameters [2]. A classic use of certutil.exe is to easily process Base64 encoded data:
Categories: Security

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